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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                            
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4301 
_____________ 
 
JANICE S. HAAGENSEN,  
 Personal Representative of the Estate of  
 Myrtle Shelburne Haagensen, 
                                               Appellant 
 v. 
 
 MICHAEL J. WHERRY, Visiting Judge,  
 Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas,  
 in his official and individual capacities;  
 BETTY MAY REED; EDWARD ABERSOLD; 
 ANNIE AND RUFUS K. HERSHBERGER;  
 RICHARD RAPONE, Tax Collector of Lawrence County;  
 J.R HARDESTER, Director of Assessments of Lawrence County;  
 KAREN MAGNONE, Property Tax Collector of North Beaver  
 Township, in an individual and official capacity          
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-14-cv-00495 
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2015)  
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Janice Haagensen is the personal representative of the estate of her 
mother, Myrtle Haagensen (collectively referred to as Haagensen), who owned 
approximately 70 acres in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.  The southern border of 
Haagensen’s land abutted parcels of land owned separately by Edward Abersold and 
Betty May Reed.  Reed accessed her land by a driveway that traveled in the vicinity of 
this border.  The driveway also happened to be in the proximity of the municipal 
boundary line between North Beaver Township on which the Haagensen land was 
situated and Little Beaver Township where the Abersold and Reed parcels were located.  
Haagensen filed a quiet title action in state court, alleging that the driveway was in North 
Beaver Township on Haagensen’s land.  Abersold, Reed, and Reed’s successors Annie 
and Rufus K. Hershberger, who purchased Reed’s farm during the pendency of the quiet 
title action, asserted the driveway was on their land.   
 On April 13, 2011, Judge Michael Wherry issued a decision in favor of Abersold, 
Reed, and the Hershbergers.1  Judge Wherry concluded that Haagensen had failed to 
establish a “right to immediate exclusive possession” of the driveway as required to 
prevail in a quiet title action.  A135.  
 Haagensen appealed, but the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court dismissed the 
appeal as untimely.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Haagensen’s petition for 
allowance of appeal. 
                                                 
1 According to a suggestion of death filed on June 4, 2015, Judge Wherry died on or 
about January 29, 2015.  Because no estate has yet to be opened, there is no party to 
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 On April 16, 2014, Haagensen filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging civil rights violations.  She sued Reed, 
her successors the Hershbergers, and Abersold (collectively the Neighbor Defendants), 
and Judge Wherry.  In addition, Haagensen sued the Tax Collector of Lawrence County, 
the Director of Assessments of Lawrence County and the Property Tax Collector for 
North Beaver Township (collectively the Tax Defendants).  All of the defendants filed 
motions to dismiss the complaint.  The Magistrate Judge prepared a report, 
recommending the dismissal of the complaint based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2  
Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, if the suit was not barred under 
Rooker-Feldman, judicial immunity barred the claim against Judge Wherry.  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that the action also was barred by the statute of limitations.  
The District Court adopted the report and recommendation.  A timely notice of appeal 
was filed after the District Court denied a timely motion for reconsideration.3   
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
bars Haagensen’s claims against the Neighbor Defendants.5  See Great W. Mining & 
                                                                                                                                                             
substitute and we will continue to refer to Judge Wherry.  Moreover, because we will 
affirm the dismissal of all claims, the motion to amend the caption is moot.  
2 The doctrine draws its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), 
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).   
3 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application 
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 
F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also exercise “plenary review over an order granting a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods. Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 765 (3d Cir. 
2013).   
4 We reject Haagensen’s contention that the District Court erred by considering the state 
court opinion and judgment.  As the Magistrate Judge explained, consideration of these 
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Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (breaking down the 
holding of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).  The 
factual allegations strongly support the conclusion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also 
bars the claims against Judge Wherry.  We need not decide that question, however, as 
Judge Wherry is absolutely immune from suit.  Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 
760, 768-69 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 As to the Tax Defendants, we are not convinced that Rooker-Feldman bars the 
claims against them.  Nonetheless, we may affirm for any reason supported by the record.  
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000).  The complaint does not allege any 
conduct that would demonstrate that the Tax Defendants deprived Haagensen of her 
constitutional rights.  Thus, we conclude that the claims against the Tax Defendants were 
appropriately dismissed because they did not assert a claim on which relief may be 
granted.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (instructing that 
a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged 
wrongs”). 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                                                                                                                                             
documents was permissible because they were items referred to in the Complaint, copies 
of which were attached for convenience to the motion.  A82.  See Pension Trust Fund for 
Operating Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 271 
(3d Cir. 2013); see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994).  
5 The District Court also concluded that the claims against Judge Wherry and the Tax 
Defendants were barred by Rooker-Feldman.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that 
Haagensen’s claims were barred because they were “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the 
state court action.”  A85.  We reiterate our observation in Great Western Mining that in 
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Exxon Mobil the Supreme Court did not rely on the “inextricably intertwined” 
formulation and we again caution against employing that analysis.  615 F.3d at 168-69. 
